testing.[转载]（2002.06）《公损之谜》目录_

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公损之谜

The Myth of Social Cost

PREFACE（Arthur Seldon）

THE AUTHOR

PROLOGUE: The "Problem" of Social Cost（Charles K.Rowley）

I.INTRODUCTION

Pigou’s externality tax: the example of chimney smoke

II.HOW TRANSACTION COSTS ARISE

1.Inadequate definition of property rights

2.Uncertain effect of externality

3.Bargaining costs

4.Failure of legal and political institutions

III.INSTRUMENTS OF GOVERNMENTINTERVENTION

Fundamental issues

The Myth of Social Cost（Steven N. S.Cheung）

I.INTRODUCTION

II.THE BASIC CONCEPTS IN SOCIAL COST

Robinson Crusoe always efficient

Pigou’s private and social costs

Pigou’s central thesis: the polluting factory

III.A TALE OF FOUR ECONOMISTS

1.Pigou’s input tax

2.Viner’s output tax

3.Coase’s transaction

4.Cheung’s aggregate balance

Uncontracted effects and unjustified government action: the case ofpiano player

Airports: commercial benefits as well as noise nuisances

Should monopoly be excluded from social cost analysis?

IV.THE FALLACY IN SPECIFYING CONSTRAINTS

The unreality of social cost analysis: Pigou’s two roads

Coase’s reciprocity and compensation (transaction) thesis

Complications:

1.Uncertain transaction costs

2.High transaction costs

3.Absence of diminishing returns

4.Unlimited property rights/prohibitive transactioncosts

V.THE CONSTRAINTS IN SOCIAL-COST ANALYSIS

Degrees of property rights

Defining the scope of transaction costs

Observing property rights via a study of constraints

VI.FALLACIES IN THE REPORTING OFOBSERVATIONS

Divergences between private and social costs: two empiricalinvestigations

1.Effects of land tenure on agricultural efficiency

Requirements in testing Pigou’s claim

Farmers refute Pigou

2.The case of the apples and the bees

Beekeepers refute Meade

Costs of information and government action

Economists’ imagination and the real world

Note to Section VI: An Empirical Study of BeehiveRentals

VII. CONCLUSION

EPILOGUE: Externalities, Property Rights and PublicPolicy: Private Property Rights or the

Spoliation of Nature（John Burton）

I.THE PIGOVIAN FORMULA

Aurther Pigou and Tom Cobbleigh

II.THE FLAWS IN THE PIGOVIAN ANALYSIS

Enter R. H. Coase and the ‘Chivirla’ School

1.The fundaments: attenuation of property rights and transactioncosts in the generation of external effects

2.Externalities are reciprocal

3.Jointly-supplied external benefits and costs

4.The administrative costs of government correction of ‘marketfailure’

5.Externalities arising from government ‘correction’ ofexternalities

6.The motives of government: economic eunuchs?

7.The motives of intervention agencies

III.THE ‘PROBLEM OF THE COMMONS’: A PRIVATEPROPERTY SOLUTION?

The private property solution: the Sahelian tragedy

The lesson of Libya

The limits to a private property solution

IV. CONCLUSIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

FURTHER READING

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